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[In September 1993, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and Hemisphere Initiatives
(HI), with assistance from the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, jointly published a report
on El Salvador's new National Civilian Police (Policia Nacional Civil, PNC). The report titled
"Risking Failure: The Problems and Promise of the New Civilian Police in El Salvador" was written
by William Stanley, a professor of political science at the University of New Mexico, and edited
by George Vickers and Jack Spence. Below is a reproduction of the report's Executive Summary,
written by Charles Call of WOLA, and reproduced by LADB with WOLA's permission. The full
report is available for US$6.00 through WOLA, 110 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, DC
20002. WOLA is currently preparing a memorandum on developments regarding the PNC which
have taken place since the report was published. For previous LADB coverage on deployment
of the PNC, see NotiSur, 10/15/93. For an in-depth look at the PNC's structure and mandate as
stipulated in the Salvadoran peace accords, see two-part series by Kevin B. Robinson: 1) "Peace
Accords Advance Amidst Mutual Accusations," in the Central America Update, 04/24/92; and
2) "New PNC Could Become a Model of Latin American Demilitarization," Central America
Update, 05/01/92.] The creation of a new National Civilian Police force (PNC) with a new training
academy and a new doctrine emphasizing citizen rights and minimal use of force is a critical part
of the peace accords that ended El Salvador's 12-year civil war between the government and the
leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The PNC was designed specifically to
supplant the Salvadoran military from its decades-old dominance of the country's internal security
functions. With former FMLN combatants making up roughly 20% of its initial personnel, the new
police force is viewed as key to guaranteeing the security of demobilized FMLN combatants as
they reenter civilian life. Perhaps most important, the PNC signifies an unprecedented attempt to
transform the relationship between state security forces and the population, historically based on
fear and repression, to one of trust and respect for individual rights. The PNC and the new National
Public Security Academy (ANSP) have emerged as one of the most internationally significant
facets of the Salvadoran peace process. Since the establishment of these new institutions was
outlined in the Peace Accords of January 1992, their development has been monitored closely by
the United Nations and the international community as a potential model for police reform and
demilitarization in a post-conflict setting. Success to date, despite obstacles In the year-and-ahalf since the peace agreements were signed, the establishment and deployment of the PNC has
encountered serious obstacles. While many of these were technical in nature, many also reflected
less-than-complete government support for a new internal security force that challenges previous
ways of doing things and established institutional interests. First, the ANSP, charged with training
new police officers and officials, opened four months late, in part because the government failed to
appropriate a suitable site from the military and was slow in allocating money to the project. Initial
rounds of recruitment and screening were badly disorganized, though basically fair. The quality
of training has suffered because of a lack of basic resources such as handcuffs, a shooting range,
two-way radios, crime lab equipment, vehicles, and a basic library. The first PNC units deployed
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also faced serious problems. Resource scarcity prompted a 25% salary cut and shortfalls of such
basic items as uniforms, food, vehicles, radios and fuel. In addition, the Defense Ministry has not
cooperated in turning over to the PNC equipment which is appropriate for police work, but not for
the military's current external defense functions. Much of this equipment was provided through
US security assistance. Despite these obstacles, the experience of the PNC and the ANSP to date
has been extremely successful. It appears that the government will meet its target of deployment in
seven departments by year's end. As of August 31, 1993, the PNC had been deployed in four of El
Salvador's fourteen territorial departments, plus a number of special zones that were particularly
conflictive during the war. Deployment is scheduled for all fourteen departments, and for some
eight specialized functional police sections, by October 1994. Officials of the UN uniformly praise
the PNC's performance to date. Government officials and representatives of political parties from
across the ideological spectrum believe that the PNC is operating effectively and positively thus
far. The PNC has obtained tangible results from its efforts to win the confidence of the population
and to orient residents to its new community-service approach and philosophy. The reporting of
crimes in areas where the PNC works appears to be up, and citizens have volunteered cooperation
in several ways, including lending horses to enable PNC agents to reach remote areas. In Cabanas,
PNC agents acted on tips to arrest the members of two notorious gangs that had operated with
impunity since the mid-1980s. Similarly, upon deployment in Chalatenango, where criminal gang
activity had been rising, PNC units sought out the communities' assistance and disbanded several
criminal gangs without firing a shot. The experiences of the PNC and the ANSP are also among
the most successful instances to date of national reconciliation following the end of the war. Fears
that former FMLN combatants and ex-National Policemen would have difficulty working alongside
one another have not materialized. Relations between the two groups are excellent, and ANSP
graduates report that over time ex-combatants have tended to leave behind differences as their
identification with the new civilian police force has solidified. PNC officers have not hesitated
to arrest former combatants from both the FMLN and the military for involvement in criminal
activity. The promising performance of the PNC to date has led international observers to see it as
a potential model for revamping internal security forces in other post-conflict settings, and for the
institutionalization of human rights protections by excluding militaries and their doctrines from
police functions. The support of bilateral international donors, and of the UN mission in El Salvador
(ONUSAL), has been critical to this promising performance. Risking failure Unfortunately, new
problems, compounded by continuing resource shortfalls and the tremendous responsibilities to
be assumed by the PNC in the coming year, raise the real possibility that the successful experience
to date will fail. In the next few months, the PNC will face its toughest challenges. In 1994, the
PNC will assume control of security in the urban areas of the country, where crime has increased
most visibly. In addition, eight specialized divisions that will prove critical to the PNC's ability
to maintain internal security will become operational. Among these are an anti-narcotics unit,
the criminal investigations unit, an arms/munitions control unit, a financial crimes unit, and a
border unit. Without the resources needed to confront highly organized criminals and without
the resources to adequately train the specialized units, the PNC could be overwhelmed by these
new tasks. Furthermore, the PNC continues to suffer severe financial limitations. As of August
1993, no units on patrol could radio for orders or assistance because of a lack of mobile or handheld
radios; many posts lacked handcuffs, jails, and fingerprinting equipment; and vehicles lacked police
lights, sirens and loudspeakers, forcing units into the dangerous practice of overtaking vehicles to
stop them. Should the PNC fail to meet its new challenges, it could increase political pressures to
revert to the old National Police, or to the armed forces, for assistance with public order, reversing
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the progress embodied in the National Civilian Police. Representatives of ONUSAL and of the
country's principal political parties fear that the absence of sufficient financial resources, particularly
international support, for the PNC may help bring about just such a scenario. The percentage of
aid dedicated to public security reforms in 1993 and 1994 by international donors (9%) is less than
half the figure for economic reconstruction activities. Almost all of that assistance has come from
the United States, Spain and Norway. Although the US has been the largest single donor to the new
police project, the low overall degree of international support seems an inadequate investment in El
Salvador's future public security, especially in light of the role of the United States in financing the
bulk of the Salvadoran defense budget only a few years ago. Several donor governments maintain
reservations or legal restrictions on aid to police forces because of the use of such assistance to
support abusive practices in the past. While strongly supportive of applying careful criteria to police
aid, Hemisphere Initiatives and WOLA believe that in the case of El Salvador, such assistance
would contribute to the institutionalization of human rights protections. Foreign donors have also
rightfully demanded greater Salvadoran governmental support for the new police force. After
initial delays, however, the Salvadoran government is dedicating substantially greater resources
to public security reforms. Another potential reason for hesitation on the part of donors is the lack
of a government plan for demobilizing the old National Police. Although the current role of the
National Police is unconstitutional, and the peace accords state that the old force shall be phased out
by October 1994, no plan for dismantling it is in place. In fact, the government continues to invest
in training 60 to 100 new officers every month for the old National Police rather than letting the
force shrink through attrition. ONUSAL representatives express concern that, after El Salvador's
March 1994 elections, political pressures may emerge to transfer units of the National Police into
the PNC. In his May 1993 report on El Salvador to the UN Security Council, Secretary General
Boutros Boutros Ghali stated that "to begin the phasing out of the National Police" is one of his
two most pressing concerns regarding the agreements on law and order in El Salvador. A recent
increase in common crime in El Salvador intensifies the challenges facing the new civilian police.
A reduction in the number of security forces deployed, combined with the unemployment, social
dislocation, and ready availability of heavy armaments that are common to most post-conflict
scenarios, has created a marked increase in the frequency and boldness of crime, especially armed
robbery. In response to political pressures generated by this increase, the government deployed
army units in a "dissuasive" role, primarily along the nation's highways, in July 1993. ONUSAL
and the US embassy unsuccessfully lobbied the government against these deployments, which
are harmful to the peace accords. The best way to preempt any further such resort to old methods
and institutions is for the PNC to receive enough resources to successfully handle its rapidly
increasing responsibilities and build political support for its monopoly over internal security
functions. Policy recommendations Several actions on the part of the international community
and the Salvadoran government could contribute to the consolidation of the National Civilian
Police. These include: 1) Bilateral donors should promptly allocate increased assistance to cover
the US$88.5 million shortfall for PNC and ANSP operations in 1993 and 1994. 2) The Salvadoran
government should present to ONUSAL a plan for the demobilization of the existing National Police
and for the deployment of the PNC's eight specialized divisions. 3) All vehicles, small arms and
radios which are appropriate for law enforcement work and which are currently in the hands of
the military should be made available to the PNC. 4) The ANSP, ONUSAL, and the National Peace
Commission's (COPAZ) police subcommission should carefully monitor the transfer into the PNC of
former police personnel, especially those of the former Special Investigations Unit and the Executive
Anti-Narcotics Unit, ensuring that they receive a complete orientation to the norms of the new
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institution with maximum interaction with PNC instructors and other ANSP students. 5) The US
State department and Congress should seek to devise a mechanism by which a US-owned building
in San Salvador might be donated for use as a PNC headquarters. 6) The Salvadoran government
should make serious efforts to find ways to shift some funds from the 1994 defense budget to the
PNC. 7) The Salvadoran Legislative Assembly should enact legislation regulating possession of
weapons of war and regulating private security companies. 8) The Salvadoran executive branch
should develop and carry out a program to collect weapons belonging to the Armed Forces that were
distributed to private citizens during the war. 9) The government, the PNC, and the ANSP should
examine the costs and benefits of utilizing the temporary training facilities at Comalapa to complete
training of the full PNC force of 10,000, rather than reducing the training pace once the initial force
of 5,940 officers is deployed in 1994. 10) In order to enhance recruitment, prevent corruption, and
maintain morale, the government should restore PNC salaries to their original levels as soon as
possible, reversing the 25% cuts made in early 1993.

-- End --
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